Clark was especially discomfited by one "nutty" aspect of the
story—a rumor that Garrison was linking Johnson to the conspiracy. As
fantastic as it sounded, the rumor seemed to have a credible source:
the Democratic representative Hale Boggs, whose district encompassed
much of New Orleans, and who had served on the Warren Commission.
Perhaps to Clark's surprise, Johnson responded to the story with
equanimity, without swearing or even muttering to himself when he heard
what Garrison was reported to be saying. As it happened, the rumor from
New Orleans was far from the wildest one making the rounds. Johnson
asked Clark if he had heard an even more fantastic rumor—one that had
been personally conveyed to the President on January 16 by Drew
Pearson, a syndicated columnist who was considered something of a
renegade by his peers. The story was that the CIA had sent men into
Cuba on a mission to assassinate Fidel Castro after the 1961 Bay of
Pigs debacle. Pearson also said that Robert Kennedy had been directly
involved.
Little wonder that Johnson received the news from New Orleans with
such restraint. He professed to Clark that he found Pearson's story
"incredible," but he could hardly have done otherwise. It would have
been political suicide for Johnson to spread, or be associated with
spreading, a rumor so potentially damaging to Kennedy. Johnson probably
believed that if Garrison was on to anything, it might be strands from
Pearson's story—which, after all, led back to Washington. Garrison
might simply have been mistaken about which Washington doorstep the
scandal led to. Johnson was not worried about being personally
implicated by either story.
As he always did when faced with a ticklish political-legal problem,
Johnson had consulted at length with his longtime counsel, Abe Fortas,
even though Fortas was by then on the Supreme Court. Johnson's idea of
what to do about the Garrison and Pearson developments was essentially
the advice Fortas had given him: watch them both carefully; start a
file; don't interfere; see how they play out.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1967, 9:40 A.M.
Call to Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark
CLARK: I think that what he [Jim Garrison] is workin' on must be the
associations that Oswald had in the three or four months that he was
down there [in New Orleans] in '62 [and] '63. I doubt ... I think it'd
just be incredible if he [Garrison] had anything that went beyond that.
I think this subject is so volatile and emotional, though, that it
could get confused and obscured.
[Uncomfortably and hesitantly] I had heard that Hale Boggs
was sayin' [that] he—Garrison—was sayin' that ... or privately around
town [was saying] that it [the assassination] could be traced back [to
you] ... or that you could be found in it someplace, which ... I can't
believe he's been sayin' that. The Bureau says they haven't heard any
such thing, and they got lots of eyes and ears.
'Course, that was a [credible] fella like Hale Boggs. But Hale gets
pretty emotional about people [like Garrison] that he really doesn't
like, and people who have fought him and been against him, and I would
be more inclined to attribute it to that. Either that, or this guy
Garrison [is] just completely off his rocker.
JOHNSON: Who did Hale tell this to?
CLARK [somewhat in disbelief]: Apparently Marvin [Watson].1
JOHNSON [aside to Watson, who was in the room]: [Did] Hale
tell you that—Hale Boggs—that this fella [Garrison, this] district
attorney down there, said that this is traced to me or somethin'?
WATSON: Privately he [Garrison] was using your name as having known
about it [the assassination]. I said [to Boggs], Will you give this
information to Barefoot Sanders?2 Ramsey was out of
town—this was Saturday night. [Boggs] said, I sure will. So I asked the
operator to get Barefoot and Ramsey together, and they did.
JOHNSON [to Clark]: Yeah, I don't know about it. They don't
ever let me in on it, Marvin and Jake [Jacobsen] over here, so you have
to call me direct.3
CLARK: Well—
JOHNSON: They just think this stuff's for them.
CLARK: Such nutty things that ... it's awfully explosive but ... The
press, really, has quite a jaundiced eye about it ... and about
Garrison, so far.4 I had several press interviews out in Des
Moines [on] Saturday evening and afternoon, and the thrust of their
questions is, What kind of nut is this?
JOHNSON: Two things I think. You know [there's] this story going
around about the CIA and their tryin' to get ... sendin' in the folks
to get [Fidel] Castro.
CLARK: To assassinate Castro.
JOHNSON: Have you got that full story laid out in front of you, and
[do you] know what it is? Has anybody ever told you all the story?
CLARK: No.
JOHNSON: I think you oughta have that. I don't ... it's incredible.
I don't believe there's a thing in the world to it, and I don't think
we oughta seriously consider it. But I think you oughta know about it.
CLARK: Who would I get it from?
JOHNSON: I've had it from three or four [sources]. I've forgotten who's come in here. I'll have to check it.
CLARK: Does the Bureau have it?
JOHNSON: No, I don't think so. You might ask 'em. Pearson—Drew
Pearson—came [in] and gave it to me. [Pearson] said [Edward] Morgan5
told him ... [Morgan is James] Hoffa's lawyer. He [Morgan] says that
they have a man that was involved, that was brought in to the CIA, with
a number of others, and instructed by the CIA and the Attorney General
[Robert Kennedy] to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs [in 1961].6
CLARK [uncomfortably]: I've heard that ... you know, I've heard that much. I just haven't heard [any] names, and places, and ...
JOHNSON: Well, let's see who it is ... let's see. I think it would
be—[it would] look very bad on us if we'd had it reported to us [a]
number of times and we just didn't pay any [attention]—just laughed ...
if this is true.
He [Morgan] says that his [client's] limitation—let's check it and
see if [the statute of] limitation[s] does run out in November ... they
say that the limitation runs out in November.7 I don't know about this conspiracy, or how much—how many years [the statute of limitations runs]—
CLARK: [It'd] be six years, all right, which would be November,
probably. But it [the statute of limitations would] not [run out] for a
concealed situation.
JOHNSON: Well, that's what I'd think. But anyway, he [Pearson] says in November he's [Rosselli's] going to tell it. And that—
CLARK: Mr. Pearson is [going to publish the story]?
JOHNSON: No. This individual [Rosselli].8
CLARK: This individual?
JOHNSON: Yeah. And these lawyers [Morgan, for one] have it.
There's just all kinds of things that come to me every day. I don't
pay any attention to 'em, but maybe I was a little worried this mornin'
because one of my lawyer friends told me I oughta call you and talk to
you about it.9 So [that] you'll have a file that protects
you, that you just don't look like they report these things to us and
we just throw 'em overboard and say, Well, we don't like 'em and it['s]
not what we wanna hear. So we're not gonna do anything about it.
But anyway, [the story is] that following this, Castro said—they
[the plotters] had these pills, and they're supposed to take 'em when
they caught 'em, and they didn't get to take their pills—so he [Castro]
tortured 'em. And they told him all about it, and who was present and
why they did it. So he [Castro] said, okay. We'll just take care of
that. So then he called Oswald and a group in, and told them to ...
about this meetin', and go set it up and get the job done.
CLARK: Uh-hmm.
JOHNSON: Now that's their story. And I talked to Abe [Fortas] about
it first, and he just said, Well, it's so incredible that ... he'd do
it.10
[Brief discussion of controversy over FBI wiretapping.]
Now here's what I called about. I just think that if you haven't
heard that, maybe you oughta put yourself in a position to either hear
Pearson or whoever's circulatin' it. There've been two or three here
circulatin' it to me, and Pearson was just one of 'em. But I've
forgotten who the others are.11 They were reputable people, or they wouldn't [have] gotten in here.
CLARK: Pearson was in last week.
JOHNSON: Who?
CLARK: I said, Pearson was in to see me last week and sat here for
thirty [or] forty minutes [and] never mentioned anything about it.
JOHNSON: Well, he came to see me ... came to see me in the [Executive] Mansion, oh, I'd say a month ago.12
And there was before that, one or two others, but I can't remember who.
They were responsible people. But it sounded just so [wild]... just
like your tellin' me that Lady Bird was taking dope. I just wouldn't
pay much attention to it. If I'm seein' her every day, I just don't
believe that that was involved.
Anyway, I'll try to think of the other names and give 'em to you.
He's the only one I can remember now, and I don't credit it ... I
credit it ninety-nine [and] ninety-nine one-hundredths percent untrue.
But that's somethin' I think we oughta know has been reported, and
y'all oughta do what you think oughta be done to protect yourself.
[Clark and the President continue to discuss how
to monitor Garrison's investigation without seeming to be either too
interested or too uninterested.]
y late February several of Jim Garrison's top aides were begging him to
drop his investigation. The sudden death (from a brain aneurysm) of his
ostensible chief witness, David Ferrie, was a golden opportunity, they
privately told him: it provided a perfect excuse to halt the probe.
"Are you crazy?" Garrison responded. "Don't you realize that we are on
the verge of solving one of the crimes of the century?"13
On March 1 Garrison ordered the arrest of Clay Shaw, one of New
Orleans's most esteemed and civic-minded businessmen, for conspiring to
assassinate President Kennedy. The city was dumbstruck, as were some of
the aides in the DA's office. But few people other than Shaw's friends
and lawyers believed that a district attorney would be so reckless and
irresponsible as to arrest a man without substantial evidence. Garrison must have something.
These events unfolded while John Connally, the governor of Texas,
who had been wounded in the Kennedy assassination, was in New York
publicizing the next World's Fair, which was scheduled to open in San
Antonio in April of 1968. Although Connally was bent on generating
attention for the exposition, reporters wanted only to talk to him
about the arrest. The feverish reporting eventually got to Connally,
who had always concurred with the overall findings of the Warren
Commission even though he disputed its "single-bullet theory."14 Now his certitude was shaken.
Connally called Johnson to discuss some of the reports he'd just
heard. He probably expected the President to be intrigued by the news,
for two reasons. He knew that Johnson's thinking often gravitated
toward conspiratorial explanations. And the story Connally was hearing
cast Robert Kennedy in a very unflattering light. Johnson, however, was
not impressed. Initially the Garrison probe and the Pearson story had
tended to reinforce each other in his mind, insofar as he had attached
any credibility to them. But by now the FBI had convinced him that
Garrison was a charlatan. And Abe Fortas had pointed out that upon
close inspection, Drew Pearson's story seemed full of holes.
THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1967, 9:22 P.M.
Call From Texas Governor John Connally
CONNALLY: I'm sorry to bother you. Can you listen to me for about five minutes?
JOHNSON: Sure.
CONNALLY: All day today I have been interviewed up here ... they're
continually breaking stories on this conspiracy thing ... based on what
this fella, this DA in New Orleans talks about, [this DA] named
Garrison.
I have just been interviewed again. And of course, I just simply say
that I know nothing about it. But a newsman named Paul Smith has just
been here to interview me again. They have a long story on the radio
tonight, over WINS, a news radio station here in New York. Charley
Payne is the [WINS] general manager, and [has] talked to me off and on
all day [trying to keep] me posted on it. They [WINS] supposedly have a
story from a man who saw the files in Garrison's office ... he is the
DA in New Orleans. I don't have the whole story, but here's what they
say.
That Garrison has information that would prove that there were four
assassination [teams] ... assassins in the United States, sent here by
[Fidel] Castro, or Castro's people. [Sent] not by Castro himself, but
one of his lieutenants. One team was picked up in New York ... but did
not ... was picked up and interviewed by the FBI and the Secret
Service, but did not reveal a great deal of information which was
available.
One of the teams was composed of Lee Harvey Oswald; this fella
[Clay] Shaw, that has just been arrested in New Orleans yesterday; and
the [deceased] man [David] Ferrie; plus one other man. They were teams
of four. And there were two other teams that I know nothing about.
WINS Radio has had some reporters, according to the media here, in
Cuba ... working on various angles of this thing for the past [few]
days. They also have a team of reporters in New Orleans with Garrison.
In Cuba they found, according—[and] this is very confidential, and all
of this is not goin' on the air ... at all.15 But in Cuba
... and the two reporters that they had there were working from
different angles and came together with exactly the same story.
The story—that they're not going to publish—is that after the [1962]
missile crisis, President Kennedy and [Nikita] Khrushchev had made a
deal to leave Castro in power. But about six months after the missile
crisis was over, the CIA was instructed to assassinate Castro ... and
sent teams into Cuba. Some of 'em were captured and tortured, and
Castro and his people—and I assume Che Guevara—heard the whole story.16
The information they have here, which they're not gonna run, is that
President Kennedy did not [issue] the order to the CIA, but that some
other person extremely close to President Kennedy did. They did not
name the man ... but the inference was very clear. The inference was
... that it was his brother [who] ordered the CIA to send a team into
Cuba to assassinate Castro. Then one of Castro's lieutenants, as a
reprisal measure, sent four teams in[to] the United States to
assassinate President Kennedy. [And] that Lee Harvey Oswald was [one of
the] members of the team operating out of New Orleans.
Now this is the story that they think they have. This is the
information that was given to me tonight, less than an hour ago, by a
reporter named Paul Smith who came here to [indistinct] Charley Payne,
whom I knew in Texas. [Payne was] a radio man down there and he's now
the general manager of WINS.
I thought this would be of interest to you. I know nothing more about it than that, but I thought you oughta know that.
JOHNSON: Good. This is confidential too. We've had that story on
about three occasions, and the people here say that there's no basis
for it.
CONNALLY: Hmm.
JOHNSON: I have had some ... I've given a lot of thought to it.
First, one of [Jimmy] Hoffa's lawyers went to one of our mutual friends—
CONNALLY: Yeah.
JOHNSON: —and asked him to come and relay that to us ... just about like you have related it.17 [A] week or two passed, and then Pearson came to me, Drew Pearson—
CONNALLY: Yeah.
JOHNSON: —[and he] told me that the lawyer, Edward Morgan here [in
Washington], had told him the same thing and said that they would plead
... they would tell all the story after November when the [statute of]
limitation[s] ran out. I don't know ... our lawyer [Ramsey Clark] said
they couldn't believe that there's any [statute of] limitation[s] on a
[concealed] conspiracy, but ... [Then] I talked to another one or two
of our good lawyers that I have recognized—
CONNALLY: Yes, sir.
JOHNSON: —[who's] pretty high-placed, a few months ago—
CONNALLY: Yes, sir.18
JOHNSON: He evaluated [it] pretty carefully and said that it was ridiculous.
With this CIA thing breaking and the thing turning, as it did, in
reconstructing the requests that were made of me back there, at the
[beginning], right after I became President, I have talked to some more
[people] about it, and I've got the A[ttorney] G[eneral] coming down to
see me tomorrow night ... to spend a weekend with me.19 I
thought I'd go over it with him again just so that they could ... so
[the FBI director J. Edgar] Hoover and 'em could watch it very
carefully.
They say that ... there's not anything to the Garrison story, [at]
least Hoover says so, as near as he can tell. He says that they
interviewed Ferrie, and they interviewed this other fella [Dean
Andrews], very carefully and closely.20 And the fella
[Andrews] claims that he got a call from Oswald, but they [the FBI]
can't find any record of it. And the doctor that had him [Andrews]
under surveillance said that he wasn't in a position to talk on
November the twenty-third, and [that] he [was] under very heavy
sedation.
And that the [Clay] Shaw thing is a phony, and that Ferrie died of
natural causes, and that that was a phony. But that—some of these same
sources that were preventin' ... tryin' to involve this jail thing ...
have been feeding stuff to Garrison as they did here.21
I don't know whether there's any basis for it or not. I noticed even
Larry—Larry Blackmon, yesterday, was in to see me on another matter—and
he started makin' a big pitch about this other situation.22
So I don't know how much of it is being fed out through their network
and through their channels, and how much of it anybody would know. It's
pretty hard to see how ... we would know directly ... what Castro did.
CONNALLY: Yeah.
JOHNSON: The story varies a good deal. If you go to lookin' at it
[hard], as Abe said, who is it that's seen Castro? Or heard from
Castro? Or knows Castro ... that's [in a position to] ... [who] could
be ... confirming all this? [Fortas said] that we just hear that this
is what he did, but nobody points to how we hear it.
CONNALLY: Yeah.
JOHNSON: So we will look into it, and I appreciate very much your
callin' me, and I'll try to bear this in mind. I may have you talk to
the other fella when you get back home, just for a minute, because I
think that it's somethin' we have to be aware of and watch, without
gettin'—
CONNALLY: Caught either way. He [Payne] made me promise—
JOHNSON: —caught either way.
[Brief discussion about Robert Kennedy's call for a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam.]
CONNALLY: I just thought [that] since this was out in the communications—
JOHNSON: Yeah ... yeah, I think that's right. I think that's good ... and I think it's right. I think—
CONNALLY: I don't know how ... I don't know what either. I thought
it might tie in with somethin' you knew, and I don't want to know
anything. I don't need to know it, but I just wanted [you] to know—
JOHNSON: Well ... no ... I've told you all I know. That's all we
know. And the FBI thinks that both Ferrie and Shaw are frauds—I mean,
that Garrison is usin' 'em as a fraud, that they have interviewed both
of 'em at great length.
CONNALLY: Yeah.
JOHNSON: They have heard these things, and they interviewed 'em back in [1963-1964], for the Warren Commission.23 They do not give any credit to it, but we can't ever be sure, and we just want to keep watchin' and so on [and] so forth.
CONNALLY: Okay, sir. I'm sorry to disturb you.
JOHNSON: Thank you, Johnny.
n March 3, 1967, the day after Johnson spoke with Connally, Jack
Anderson, Drew Pearson's associate, broke the story of the alleged
plots against Castro.24 The column began, "President Johnson
is sitting on a political H-bomb, an unconfirmed report that Senator
Robert Kennedy may have approved an assassination plot [against Castro]
which then possibly backfired against his late brother." The column was
so thinly sourced—it admitted that the story was a rumor—that The Washington Post and the New York Post
refused to publish it. But hundreds of other newspapers went ahead.
Anderson had rushed into print almost certainly because he feared being
scooped by Jim Garrison. The column observed that the allegation it
described "may have started New Orleans' flamboyant District Attorney
Jim Garrison on his investigation of the Kennedy assassination," but
that insiders "believe he is following the wrong trails."
Spurred on by the column, Ramsey Clark finally did what Johnson had
suggested during their conversation on February 20: he asked the FBI
what it knew about the matter. On March 6 the FBI prepared what is
surely one of the most astonishing memoranda in its history. The
heading alone was enough to set hearts palpitating at the CIA: "Central
Intelligence Agency's Intentions to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to
Assassinate Castro." The FBI knew far less than it thought it did about
the covert operation, but its information was reliable on three vital
points: the CIA did try to have Castro assassinated during the early
1960s; it employed members of the Cosa Nostra in this effort; and
Attorney General Robert Kennedy knew about both the plots and the mob's
involvement. Before receiving this memo, Johnson had dismissed the
rumor as no more credible than the idea that his wife was on drugs. Now
he had to grapple with the implications of the revelation and what he
should do about it, if anything.
One of his first impulses was to talk to Chief Justice Earl Warren.
In the early evening of March 13 Johnson met privately with Warren for
forty minutes, with only Marvin Watson, the White House staffer who
served as liaison with the FBI, in attendance. Little is known about
this meeting. Since January, Warren had been aware of the story that
the CIA had utilized the Mafia to try to assassinate Castro; Pearson
had told him three days after telling Johnson. But until he stepped
into the Oval Office that evening, he did not know that the story was
true. Warren's rock-solid belief in the report that bears his name must
have been weakened, at least momentarily.
The meeting had two consequences. The Chief Justice was, of course,
thoroughly conversant with the evidence against Oswald, and he probably
renewed Johnson's confidence in that part of the Warren Report. But the
finding that Oswald was responsible for all the shots fired in Dealey
Plaza didn't rule out a conspiracy. And now there was more reason than
ever to believe that Fidel Castro had instigated a counterplot in
retaliation for attempts on his life. So Johnson, perhaps with Warren's
encouragement, became determined to get the rest of the story from the
CIA.
On March 22 he asked Richard Helms, who had been the CIA liaison to
the Warren Commission in 1964 and the director of the Agency since June
of 1966, to prepare a full report on the allegations in Anderson's
column. It is not known whether the President divulged to Helms what he
already knew from the FBI memorandum, or whether he pretended to find
the claim outlandish in order to test Helms's candor about such a
sensitive matter. In either case, Johnson asked "[not] idly or in
passing ... but asked directly, formally, and explicitly, in a tone and
manner which did not admit of evasion," as the historian Thomas Powers
has written.
The President is the one person whose requests for information the
CIA must honor in full, and Helms had no alternative but to come back
with a specific and complete answer. In early May he requested a
private meeting with Johnson in order to present the results of an
investigation conducted by the CIA's inspector general. The meeting, on
May 10, began at 5:55 P.M. and lasted close to an hour. The gist of
what Helms disclosed would become known only eight years later, when he
testified before a Senate committee.
In that meeting, long before the fact became public knowledge, the
President learned that CIA plots to assassinate Fidel Castro dated back
to August of 1960—to the Eisenhower Administration, when plans for what
became the Bay of Pigs invasion were reaching their final stage. In
fact, Castro was supposed to be dead before the exiles landed. At the
time, the idea of using members of the Cosa Nostra, which had its own
interests in Cuba to protect, must have seemed clever.
The more interesting part, at least to Johnson, was what Helms told
him next. After the Bay of Pigs debacle, rather than draw back, the
Kennedy Administration redoubled its efforts. The injunction to the CIA
was simple: get rid of Castro and his regime by any means possible,
short of another invasion. The alliance with the Cosa Nostra persisted
until 1962, and came to an end only because the mob bosses were never
able to deliver. Efforts to remove Castro continued well into 1963. One
of them was coming to a head at the time Kennedy was assassinated.
It is not known whether Johnson asked Helms under whose direction
the CIA had acted. If he did, Helms presumably said that Robert Kennedy
"personally managed the operation on the assassination of Castro."
(This quotation is taken from what Helms told Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in 1975, after allegations of CIA wrongdoing began to surface
in the press.) Then again, Johnson may not have bothered to ask. Edward
Morgan had already told Drew Pearson about the former Attorney
General's central role; in addition, it was common knowledge within the
Administration that after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy had made
his brother the driving force behind the effort to overthrow Castro.
Knowing the President's conspiratorial turn of mind, Helms probably
hastened to reassure Johnson that the CIA, the FBI, and the Warren
Commission had all looked long and hard for a connection between Oswald
and Cuba but had come up empty-handed. Persuading Johnson of that now,
however, was a futile exercise (as later testimony by Helms suggests).
The President was utterly convinced that something other than Oswald
was behind Kennedy's assassination, and that that something involved
Cuba.
One tantalizing but unanswerable question is what effect, if any,
Johnson's knowledge had on Robert Kennedy's Hamlet-like indecisiveness
in 1967 and early 1968 over whether to challenge Johnson for the
Democratic nomination. Kennedy probably considered the March 3 column a
shot across his bow, because Pearson was known to be on very friendly
terms with the President. For all Kennedy knew, Johnson was the
source of the story, and the column was a harbinger of things to come
should Kennedy decide to challenge him. (Kennedy finally did enter the
race, in March of 1968.) Kennedy's response to the column, insofar as
it is known, was to hurriedly search his files for any pertinent
information. He also arranged to have lunch on March 4 with Richard
Helms, who probably told him that the President hadn't yet asked
anything about it. Still, the threat of disclosure loomed—and perhaps
it motivated Kennedy's seemingly premature announcement that he fully
intended to back Johnson's presumed bid for re-election. On March 2, in
a dramatic address on the Senate floor, Kennedy had made his break with
the Administration's policy on Vietnam official. Anderson's column
appeared the next day. Two weeks later Kennedy pledged to support
Johnson in 1968, calling him "an outstanding President."
Certainly, any attempt to publicize the truth would have been
fraught with risks for Johnson. Kennedy partisans would have mounted a
ferocious counterattack, and Johnson might have been unable to prove an
allegation that would be perceived as monstrous. Also, a sitting
President could hardly ignore the price the CIA and the United States
would pay for admitting that the Agency had tried to assassinate
Castro—and at that point, in 1967, Johnson fully expected to serve
another full term. The final, unquantifiable factor was Johnson's
residual loyalty to John Kennedy. Johnson had always tried to keep
faith with that political partnership. As much as he might have been
tempted to derail Robert Kennedy's ambition by publicizing the story,
he had to have realized that JFK's reputation would have been sullied
too. Johnson was "trapped between two Kennedys," in the words of the
historian Paul Henggeler. "He could not openly attack Robert without
implicitly attacking John."
But though Johnson said nothing publicly to advance the story about
the CIA's plots against Castro, there is little doubt that the secret
weighed heavily on him. His reaction to the news that Robert Kennedy
had been mortally wounded on June 5, 1968, shortly after midnight
California time, is revealing. Johnson was awakened almost immediately,
and was not able to sleep the rest of the night.25 Between
telephone calls to Ramsey Clark, J. Edgar Hoover, and James Rowley, the
chief of the Secret Service, Johnson doodled on a memo from the
previous day. In the first hours after the shooting virtually nothing
was known about Kennedy's assassin. Johnson wondered if Castro had
decided that his revenge would not be complete until both Kennedy
brothers were dead. He scratched out a few disjointed words: "Costra
[sic] Nostra ... Ed Morgan ... send in to get Castro ... planning." By
late morning, however, it was clear that Sirhan Sirhan was a disturbed
loner with no apparent ties to Cuba. Johnson dropped his idea of
another Cuban-instigated conspiracy.26
In the months and years that followed, Johnson remained ambivalent,
torn between his loyalty to John Kennedy and his antipathy toward
Robert. In October of 1968, shortly before leaving office, he
volunteered a piece of information to the veteran newsman Howard K.
Smith, whom he deeply respected. "I'll tell you something [about John
Kennedy's murder] that will rock you," he said. "Kennedy was trying to
get to Castro, but Castro got to him first." "I was rocked all right,"
Smith later recalled; he begged for details. But Johnson refused to
provide any, saying only, "It will all come out one day." Johnson was
so obviously worn down by the bitterness of his years in office that
Smith was left wondering if he had just witnessed a last bit of Johnson
blarney.
After leaving office Johnson continued to seesaw between discretion
and an aching desire to let the truth come out. He was interviewed in
September of 1969 for a series of programs about his presidency, which
were to be broadcast on CBS in three installments. As they discussed
President Kennedy's assassination, Walter Cronkite asked Johnson if he
was satisfied that there had been no foreign conspiracy. "I can't
honestly say that I've ever been completely relieved of the fact that
there might have been international connections," Johnson replied.
Cronkite pushed a little harder, asking if Johnson's suspicions
involved Cuba. Johnson replied, "Oh, I don't think we ought to discuss
the suspicions, because there's not any hard evidence that would lead
me to the conclusion that Oswald was directed by a foreign government."
Three weeks before the segment aired, Johnson had second thoughts; he
insisted that the exchange be deleted, on grounds of "national
security." CBS reluctantly obliged; but in April of 1970 the story that
Johnson "expressed fundamental doubts about the Warren Commission's
conclusion" during the Cronkite interview leaked out anyway.
Conspiracy books usually treat John and Robert Kennedy
as innocent babes who would not have thought about dirty tricks — much
less assassination plots — against Castro. But the reality was very
different.
|
On June 16, 1971, Johnson received Leo Janos, the Houston bureau chief for Time magazine, at the Johnson Library. The meeting occurred at a propitious moment. Three days earlier The New York Times
had published the first installment in what would become known as the
Pentagon Papers, a secret study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. There
was much to talk about, and Johnson was in an expansive mood. Over
coffee after lunch the conversation turned briefly to President
Kennedy. Confident that his former speechwriter would respect the
ground rules (the conversation was off the record), Johnson not only
reiterated what he had told Howard K. Smith in 1968 and Walter Cronkite
in 1969 but went into more detail than he ever had before, making his
pregnant "Murder Inc." remark—which Janos did not publish until after
Johnson's death.
Lyndon Johnson might be forgiven for jumping to his conclusion about
a link between Castro and Lee Harvey Oswald. In any case, his opinion
on who stood behind Oswald is not what is most significant about his
revelation to Janos. Rather, Johnson was trying, somewhat awkwardly, to
flesh out what was from his vantage point the central story of his
years in office: the mutiny of liberal Democrats against his primacy,
and their unfair treatment of him. If the CIA's attempts to assassinate
Castro had been known more or less contemporaneously with JFK's
assassination, the Kennedy mystique would have been punctured. The
public's view of Johnson's ascension to power would not have soured; at
the very least, William Manchester would not have been able to violate
the conventions by which reputable publishing houses then depicted
sitting Presidents. Nor would a large faction of the Democratic Party
have coalesced around Robert Kennedy had his clandestine activities
been known.
Johnson's motives in telling Janos about "Murder Inc." in a
conversation that was off the record can only be surmised. In all
likelihood they reflect how, even in retirement, he remained deeply
conflicted. Johnson was reluctant to release information during his
lifetime that would have tarnished the Kennedy and Eisenhower
presidencies. But he must have hoped that the truth would eventually
surface, and that it would influence history's verdict on his own.
1 Watson was a special assistant to the President.
2 Harold Barefoot Sanders was the assistant attorney general in charge of the civil division at the Justice Department.
3 Jacobsen was a special counsel to the President.
4 Members of the press may have been privately skeptical, but Garrison was getting a lot of attention.
5 Morgan was one of the toughest, shrewdest, and
best-connected criminal lawyers in town. He was particularly well
plugged in to the FBI, having worked in the Bureau for seven years
before striking out on his own as a lawyer, in 1947. Morgan had also
served as counsel to three congressional investigations, including the
1946 investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack and a 1950 Senate
investigation into Communist penetration of the State Department.
During the latter he became enmeshed in a bitter feud with Joe
McCarthy, who accused Morgan of being a skilled "whitewasher" of
embarrassing secrets.
6 Johnson did not know the name of Morgan's client. He
was John Rosselli, a member of the Cosa Nostra. Rosselli's name would
not surface publicly until 1971, when the journalist Jack Anderson
published it in a column.
7 Morgan had apparently told Rosselli that the statute of
limitations for conspiring to kill someone was six years, as long as
the plot had failed. Therefore, according to Morgan, Rosselli could not
be prosecuted after November of 1967.
8 Pearson's diary suggests that he did intend to publish
the story once the statute of limitations ran out and he heard
Rosselli's complete account, assuming he received permission from
Morgan.
9 As he revealed a moment later, Johnson had talked to Abe Fortas.
10 It is not clear whether, according to Johnson, Fortas
found it incredible that RFK allegedly directed assassination plots
against Castro or that Castro allegedly dared to retaliate.
11 At this point Pearson is the only person known to have
told Johnson about assassination plots directed against Castro. But in
a conversation with Texas Governor John Connally in March, Johnson
would again suggest that he had heard the story from someone in
addition to Pearson.
12 The meeting, which was off the record, had taken place
on January 16, and lasted for an hour. In his diary Pearson wrote, "I
told the president about Ed Morgan's law client ... Lyndon listened
carefully and made no comment. There wasn't much he could say."
13 This extraordinary confrontation between Garrison and his top assistants would remain a secret for sixteen years.
14 The Warren Report posited that the bullet that hit
President Kennedy in the base of his neck and exited from his throat
also caused all of Connally's wounds.
15 Connally was referring to the fact that WINS was
reporting only half the story. It broadcast the claim that President
Kennedy was "murdered by a group of plotters directed from Cuba," but
refrained from reporting that the group had been sent in retaliation
for U.S. plots on Castro's life.
16 Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine Communist,
had been a leader of the 1959 Cuban revolution. In 1967 there was a
great mystery as to his whereabouts; he had not been seen in public for
two years.
17 It is unclear who this "mutual friend" was.
18 Connally seemed to understand that Johnson was
referring to Abe Fortas. The President had met with Fortas for
seventy-five minutes on January 17, the day after he first heard
Pearson's story.
19 The "CIA thing" the President referred to involved
recent revelations that the CIA had covertly financed nongovernmental
anticommunist organizations both in the United States and abroad. By
"requests made of me," Johnson probably meant the decision he'd had to
make after November 22 about whether to continue covert subversion of
Castro's regime. (This effort gradually diminished.)
20 Andrews was a colorful Louisiana character: five foot
seven and 240 pounds, he was a bona fide lawyer and, simultaneously, a
huckster looking to make a name for himself. In November of 1963, while
hospitalized for pneumonia, Andrews claimed to have received a
mysterious call from a man asking him to represent the accused
assassin. A thorough FBI investigation determined that Andrews was
simply seeking some of the notoriety that any counsel for Oswald was
sure to receive; the lead, like the FBI's contemporaneous investigation
of David Ferrie, turned up nothing with any bearing on the President's
assassination. Four years later these would be the kinds of meaningless
shards Garrison had the power to exploit.
21 Johnson seems to have been suggesting that the same
lawyers who fed Drew Pearson the story about assassination plots
against Castro had been in contact with Garrison.
22 A real-estate developer from Fort Worth, Blackmon was the president of the National Home Builders Association.
23 Although the FBI had examined an allegation involving
Ferrie, it had never investigated Clay Shaw in connection with the
assassination. Johnson was probably just repeating what Ramsey Clark
had said earlier in the day. In response to questions from the media,
Clark erroneously asserted that Shaw had been investigated by the FBI
in 1963, and cleared. Clark's error would not be acknowledged for three
months.
24 Pearson had told Johnson the story would not be
published at least until November, but he had made that assurance
before Garrison arrived on the scene. On the day of Clay Shaw's
unexpected arrest, Pearson was en route to Latin America and apparently
unreachable. Anderson, who often shared the byline on the column, took
it upon himself to publish the story. "It was a poor story in the first
place, and violated a confidence in the second place," Pearson later
noted in his diary. "Finally it reflected on Bobby Kennedy without
actually pinning the goods on him."
25 "There was an air of unreality about the whole thing—a
nightmare quality," Lady Bird Johnson wrote in her diary. "It couldn't
be true. We must have dreamed it. It had all happened before."
26 In his biography of Robert Kennedy, Evan Thomas
suggested (on the basis of these handwritten notes) that Johnson toyed
with the idea of reviving Pearson's story on June 4, the day Kennedy
won the California primary and appeared headed for the Democratic
nomination. But the notes, although written on a memo dated June 4,
were clearly identified by the secretary who collected them as being
from "June 5, 1968 a.m."—that is, after Kennedy had been shot. They
probably indicate Johnson's initial thoughts about who might have been
responsible for the attack, rather than any effort to cast aspersions
on Kennedy's past.
This excerpt from
The Kennedy Assassination Tapes (Knopf, 2004) was published in
The Atlantic Monthly in June 2004.
© 2004 by Max Holland